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Abstract 
 
This paper discusses the prospects of overcoming the hurdles to implementing a policy 
of road pricing in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) via Global Navigation Satellite System 
(GNSS) technology. The paper begins by outlining some of the theories and issues surrounding 
road pricing implementation. Next, the experiences of three other jurisdictions with 
implementing road pricing are analyzed, followed by an analysis of the debate in the GTA and 
the merits of GNSS tolling compared to other policy options. The two main hurdles to GNSS 
road pricing in the GTA, costs of the system and privacy concerns, are identified and examined. 
Suggestions to overcome these hurdles are offered and evaluated. The paper concludes with an 
analysis of how such an implementation strategy would affect the issues of road pricing 
acceptance and governance.  
 
Foreword 
 
The plan of study is about political economy and the policy changes necessary for an 
appropriate response to public energy-related problems. The main demand-related transportation 
problem is traffic congestion. When the demand for roads outstrips supply, time and fuel 
efficiency during travel decreases. Road pricing is a policy tool that directly affects the energy 
economy but rather than being applied to the energy production system, it‟s applied to the energy 
demand side.  It increases the resiliency of an urban transportation problem by providing a 
financial incentive to motorists to increase the proportion to which alternative modes of travel 
are used.   
The major paper helps to fulfill the requirements of the MES degree by partially 
achieving the learning objectives of the Plan of Study.  These objectives include:  
- to learn how politics has, and how it can continue to, affect the management of an energy 
transition 
- to learn the economic and behavioural barriers to significant energy-related policy change 
- to understand the contributions various actors make towards policy change 
- to understand the strategic approaches governments take towards energy policy problems 
- to understand the technical solutions for  an energy transition 
- to understand the financial solutions for an energy transition 
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1.0 Introduction 
It has often been argued that the Greater Toronto Area‟s (GTA) has transportation 
system is unsustainable. A study by HDR Corporation on the costs of road congestion in the 
GTA stated that “delay, diminished productivity, wasted energy, environmental degradation and 
a diminished standard of living…threaten the region‟s viability as a decent place to live, visit and 
conduct business” (HDR Corporation, 2008). The study concluded that if the region‟s 
transportation patterns follow business as usual, the reduction in GDP due to excess congestion 
would increase from $2.7 billion in 2006 to $7.2 billion in 2031 – an increase of 167 percent 
(HDR Corporation, 2008). In Ontario, transportation accounts for the highest demand for energy 
in the province, and passenger vehicles represent 73 per cent of the greenhouse gas emissions 
from road transportation (Miller, 2010).  It is clear that an important policy objective in the GTA 
should be to reduce the dependence on automobiles for transportation services. This paper looks 
at one public policy option, road pricing, as a mechanism to solve automobile dependency. 
In response to the GTA‟s automobile dependency, the Province of Ontario started the 
“Smart Commute” program that advises employers on how to promote carpooling, transit, 
cycling walking and teleworking as alternative commute methods to a private automobile 
(www.smartcommute.ca, 2011).  Metrolinx, the region‟s transportation authority adopted “The 
Big Move” or its Regional Transportation Plan (Regional Transportation Plan) in 2008.  The 
plan calls for building over 1200 kilometres of rapid transit, essentially tripling existing services 
(Metrolinx, 2010). This project is estimated to cost $50 billion in capital over 25 years and 
approximately $1.5 billion per year in ongoing operation and maintenance (Metrolinx, 2010). 
Fulfilling long-term funding requirements for “The Big Move” would be an ever-growing strain 
on provincial and local budgets if their existing structures do not change. Moreover, new public 
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transit infrastructure represents only the pull factor of a policy to reduce automobile dependency. 
As Glaister and Graham argue, no big move can be planned in isolation from push factors 
(Glaister & Graham, 2006).   
 
History suggests that push factors such as road pricing proposals are very unpopular for 
a variety of reasons, and the case of the GTA is no exception.  A common theme in the current 
transportation debate in the GTA is whether or not road pricing should be implemented for the 
purpose of subsidizing public transit (Toronto Board of Trade, 2010).  It may be that public 
transit subsidies need not be very extensive if by reducing automobile dependency in turn makes 
public transit become more competitive (Gilbert, 2010).  In any case, this paper will not discuss 
public transit, crucial to alleviating automobile dependency as it is.  Instead, this paper will focus 
only on how to provide solutions to traffic congestion and implement road pricing in the GTA, 
despite the concept‟s lack of popularity.  
 
1.1 Externalities and User Fees 
The concept of road pricing comes from the economic theory of externalities (J. N. 
Buxbaum, 2009).  When the market fails to balance the levels of supply and demand, some of the 
costs of product are not included in their price, and are externalized. Externalities from an 
unbalanced market for road use include congestion and harmful emissions.  One could strike a 
balance if access to the supply is manually limited by, for example, banning the use of vehicles 
with licence plates that end in an even number for half the week, and banning odd number plates 
for the second half.  This, however, is not a practical approach for an urban transportation 
system. Instead, most products and services supplied in the marketplace rely on pricing to align 
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demand with supply. If demand exceeds supply, prices will rise, and some customers (motorists) 
will choose not to buy (drive). In the case of transportation services, supply from the public is 
limited and often is exceeded by private demand. When there is no charge on a motorist for 
entering a highway, the motorist does not consider that he or she is imposing a cost on others. 
Buxbaum argues that the under-pricing of roads results in a market failure called congestion (J. 
N. Buxbaum, 2009).  He argues further that assigning a price to the use of a road seeks to correct 
this market failure by, for example, reducing demand for low value trips and therefore reducing 
the supply shortage. 
 
1.2 Efficiency and Equity 
In a public policy context, it has been argued, by Kitchen for example, that user fees 
achieve economic efficiency in the provision of goods and services that have private 
characteristics (Kitchen, 2011).  Goods and services that have private characteristics are those 
where one person‟s consumption means that this good/service is not available to anyone else. 
Roads should be considered to have private characteristics because the space occupied by one 
vehicle cannot be shared with another vehicle (Kitchen, 2011).    
Traditionally, roads have been “priced” with a tax of motor fuels. Fruits and Pozdena 
argue that since fuel taxes are not fully related to the burden vehicles place on society, 
externalities have progressed (Fruits and Pozdena, 2008). Moreover, if governments successfully 
manage to discourage fossil fuel consumption, these taxes will not be able to pay for roads in the 
long run.  
Restructuring transportation markets with direct user fees is not simple. Buxbaum 
suggests that maximizing efficiency can conflict with equity concerns when choosing a road 
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pricing design and rate structure (J. N. Buxbaum & Ortiz, 2009). The choices involve: (1) which 
types of roads will be priced such as upon entrance to major roads and highways, upon entering 
an urban core, or all roads in a jurisdiction; (2) how will prices vary such as with certain days of 
the week, times, locations, congestion levels; (3) will anyone receive discounts to such road use 
such as low income individuals; (4) and where will the revenues go such as into general 
government coffers, transportation infrastructure, or rebates in the form of tax breaks?  The 
certain disagreements that occur over answers to these policy questions is one reason why so 
many more road pricing proposals have been rejected than implemented. 
 
1.3 Political Will and Policy Change 
A potential policy change (i.e. implementing road pricing) has less chance of success if 
it arouses negative emotions and can be attached to a politician (Westen, 2007).  To avoid 
negative reactions toward traffic congestion, policymakers talk about fixing the GTA‟s 
transportation system by implementing Metrolinx‟s Regional Transportation Plan, but do not talk 
about how the plan will be financed.  While the Regional Transportation Plan‟s demand for 
public resources is great, the predicted changes in travel behaviour implied by it are even greater. 
Where the change in population is about the same for the periods 1986-2006 and 2006-2031, 
transit origins during the morning peak are predicted to increase by 132 per cent compared to an 
increase of only 11 per cent for the period 1986 to 2006 (Soberman, 2010).  Such an 
unprecedented change requires unprecedented measures that take into account the human interest 
in maximizing personal gains.  
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This paper proposes a road pricing system for the GTA based on Global Navigation 
Satellite Systems (GNSS) technology with an On-Board Unit in each vehicle. The road pricing 
system could toll vehicle use throughout the entire region based on any pricing options desired. 
Such a scheme has yet to be introduced, perhaps because it is dismissed by opponents as being 
too expensive and intrusive (Anable and Boardman, 2005).  But by tolling all roads and levying 
fees for direct road use, it is possible to minimize negative externalities and maximize the 
efficiency of the GTA‟s transportation system.  
 
Politics, human behavior, and specific circumstances surrounding the GTA present 
serious hurdles in path to implementing GNSS road pricing: managing the cost and privacy 
concerns surrounding the technology, achieving acceptance of the policy among stakeholders, 
and solving the issues of how to govern the revenues.  This paper will discuss approaches to 
overcome these hurdles, approaches that require the distinct abilities GNSS technology 
possesses.    
 
1.4 Methodology 
The research consisted of collecting qualitative data in newspaper articles, journal 
articles and blogs. The paper begins with an analysis of the experiences three different 
jurisdictions had attempting to implement road pricing. Lessons are drawn from these 
experiences to help inform the further discussion. The same method is then applied to the 
experience of the GTA, while arguing the merits of GNSS road pricing to this specific case.  The 
remainder of the paper focuses on the main hurdles in the path toward implementing GNSS road 
pricing in the GTA, and evaluates ways to overcome them.  
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2.0 Past Developments in the GTA and Other Jurisdictions 
This chapter will discuss the experiences of three jurisdictions attempting to implement 
road pricing: the tolling of high occupancy vehicle lanes in San Diego County, the attempt to 
pass road pricing legislation in the Netherlands, and the testing of a mileage fee in the State of 
Oregon.  Most information regarding these jurisdictions‟ experiences was found by analysing 
their respective newspapers, though government documents and academic journals were also 
used.  Each of the three sections of this chapter will give an account of the events and make 
sense of them in a political economic framework.   Lessons for the GTA will then be drawn from 
this discussion.   
 
2.1 San Diego County 
San Diego‟s experience with road pricing began with the need to accommodate a large 
increase in population and commuters to and from the City of San Diego.   By the late 1980s, 
traffic congestion was exacerbating.  Ramp meters at some freeway entrances were making 
drivers wait up to ten minutes during rush hour (Curran-Downey, 1994). The number of miles 
driven each weekday in the county had increased by 7 percent a year -- twice the rate of the 
population growth.  However, it was an increase in air pollution that prompted the County to 
tackle its transportation problems (Weisburg, 1991a).   In 1988, the State of California passed the 
Clean Air Act which mandated a reduction in the sources of air pollution contributing to smog 
(Weisburg, 1991a).  San Diego County had to bring its average vehicle ridership up to 1.5 
persons during the peak-period commute from 1.2 at the time, and substantially reduce vehicle 
trips and miles traveled by 1997 so that the rate of growth did not exceed that of the population 
(ibid). 
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One government agency, the Air Pollution Control District (APCD), was mandated in 
1988 to develop a plan to meet these legislative requirements.  In addition, the regional planning 
agency, San Diego Association of Governments took the initiative and developed an alternative 
plan for the County in 1991 (Weisburg, 1991a).   The Air Pollution Control District plan was 
very robust, proposing to force businesses to eliminate free parking to their employees and 
directly taxing businesses to fund an expansion of mass transit (Weisburg, 1991b).  The San 
Diego Association of Governments, comprised of elected officials, opposed these strict 
proposals, and advocated for a „less prescriptive approach‟ (ibid).  Even though the Air Pollution 
Control District had the final say over the official plan, it negotiated with the San Diego 
Association of Governments in an attempt to reach an agreement.  It was in the San Diego 
Association of Governments‟ interest to convince the Air Pollution Control District and the 
county in general, that it was not afraid to take bold measures to alleviate congestion and 
improve public transit.   
 
The major area of congestion in the county was Interstate 15, connecting the county 
suburbs to the City of San Diego.  By 1988, eight miles of high occupancy vehicle lanes were 
made to help with the “war on the single occupant vehicle” but failed to attract many carpools 
(TRB, 2009). In 1991 Jan Goldsmith, mayor of a County suburb and a member of the San Diego 
Association of Governments, suggested lifting restrictions on the high occupancy vehicle lanes 
for single occupant drivers who are willing to pay. Goldsmith was interested in raising money for 
mass transit improvements (Goldsmith, 1996).  The San Diego Association of Governments‟ 
board applied for funding from a federal congestion pricing program of the Intermodal Surface 
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Transportation Efficiency Act, adopted by the U.S. Congress in 1991 (ibid). The funding was to 
test the idea of charging solo drivers who wish to use the car pool lanes on Interstate 15. The San 
Diego Association of Governments thought the funds collected could be used to expand mass 
transit on I-15 (ibid). 
 
Implementing this law required legislation from the State of California.  By 1993, 
Goldsmith was a Republican State Assemblyman, representing eastern San Diego County, and 
the author of a bill to convert the I-15 high occupancy vehicle lanes into High Occupancy Toll 
lanes.  He presented Bill 713 as “a creative way of raising some transit funds for an underutilized 
corridor without raising taxes” (Mendel, 1993).  Bill 713 became law.  It required that the I-15 
express lanes ensure “free-flow” conditions for high occupancy vehicles at all times, unrestricted, 
free access to the lanes by high occupancy vehicles, the use of revenue only to transit and high 
occupancy vehicle improvements for the I-15 corridor (Supernak et al, 2002). In January 1995, 
the San Diego Association of Governments received a $7.96 million federal grant from 
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act‟s program to pay for half of the projects costs, 
and the other half came from the toll revenues and California‟s gasoline tax (Supernak et al, 
2002). 
 
The tolls began in the form of monthly permits; a limited number of colour coded hang 
tags affixed to the rear-view mirror for unlimited use of the lanes per month.  San Diego 
Association of Governments slowly increased the monthly permit fee to test the effect on 
motorists‟ willingness to pay.  The demand for these permits grew and as supply followed, prices 
went up (Arner, 1997).  The findings from this test influenced the pricing structure that San 
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Diego Association of Governments deployed after only several months of operation. San Diego 
Association of Governments launched an all-electronic variable toll collection system called 
“FasTrak” where subscribers pay for each trip on the I-15 High Occupancy Toll lanes. The rate 
varies in real time, depending on the number of cars using the High Occupancy Toll lanes 
(Supernak et al, 2002). 
 
Opposition to the High Occupancy Toll lanes project occurred both before and after Bill 
713 became law.  During debate in the California Legislature, advocacy groups such as the 
Sierra Club and the Professional Engineers of California Government argued that carpooling was 
being discouraged and highways were becoming privatized leaving less work for the public 
sector (Mendel, 1993).  These advocates failed to convince enough lawmakers. 
 
As the months and years went on, the High Occupancy Toll lanes were successfully 
accommodating more vehicles.  The population and the economy, however, were still growing, 
so I-15 congestion was still a problem.  A group upset with congestion launched a campaign to 
open the High Occupancy Toll lanes to all traffic. Called Project NOEL for "No Exclusive 
Lanes", the campaign was joined by the San Diego Taxpayers Association (Berhman, 1997), and 
involved themselves in the election to replace Goldsmith (who was being forced out by term 
limits) in his district.  The notable contest was in the Republican primary where many candidates 
sympathized with Project NOEL and viewed traffic congestion as government encroachment on 
people‟s lives (Braun, 1998).  Fortunately for the High Occupancy Toll lanes, the winner was a 
moderate Republican endorsed by Goldsmith.  This was evidence that the original and most 
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prominent proponent of congestion pricing in San Diego County did not suffer political 
repercussions for his actions.    
 
Though politics did not substantially interfere with the High Occupancy Toll lanes 
development, opposition remained.  This opposition persisted on the issue of equity and the 
argument that rich people can speed past the poor who remain stuck in traffic.  Discrediting this 
argument was the fact that High Occupancy Toll lanes had many different types of users; people 
at all income levels were using the lanes when saving time was important to them (Poole Jr., 
2001).  Furthermore, the toll revenues went to an express bus services that also used the High 
Occupancy Toll lanes, enticing some drivers to take public transit along I-15.  Finally, carpoolers 
on the I-15 did not believe that the pricing program affected them adversely, because the original 
law required the lanes to constantly be free-flowing (ibid). 
 
Today, as the leading agency, the San Diego Association of Governments plans to 
quadruple the area of High Occupancy Toll lanes on I-15.  It has done so in part because nearly 
every public opinion study about the High Occupancy Toll lanes between 1996 and 2005 has 
revealed broad support for the congestion pricing concept and for expanding it in Southern 
California (TRB, 2009).  Some of the support can be attributed to the specific characteristics of 
the High Occupancy Toll lanes project instead of some unique cultural qualities in San Diego 
County.  First, the tolls paid went exclusively to servicing the lanes and the bus service on them. 
There was little perception that these user fees were an additional tax.  Second, the lanes were 
previously exclusive to high occupancy vehicles. Drivers did not see the policy as taking away 
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previously free lanes (Harrington et al, 2001).  San Diego County‟s High Occupancy Toll lanes 
were one of the first and few success stories of congestion pricing.   
 
2.2 The Netherlands 
The country of the Netherlands has some of the highest economic activity in Europe, 
and one of the world‟s largest population densities.  The Randstad, an agglomeration of the 
Netherlands four largest cities, is one of the largest in Europe.  Two-thirds of the Randstad‟s area 
is the “Green Heart”, an area of 160,000 hectares of agricultural land protected against urban 
uses, including roads since 1958 (Carter-Whitney, 2010).  Furthermore, the Netherlands also has 
a rigid housing market, due to the “Green Heart” that poses barriers for people who want to 
move closer to their jobs (Kozluk, 2010).  It should therefore be no surprise that the country has 
major traffic congestion problems.  Over the last 20 years, despite its relative small size, the 
average commuting distance has increased by 45% and as a result, Dutch workers spend more 
time commuting than those in other European countries (Kozluk, 2010).  Despite these push 
factors, the car is the dominant mode of transportation (Van der Waard, 2008). 
 
The Dutch government has tried to respond to this issue with road pricing measures 
many times, but these efforts have produced limited results due to a variety of political and 
technological reasons (Custers & Kuiper, 2010). In 1999 the government planned to build toll 
booths on all access and exit roads in the Randstad to charge rush hour driving fees.  These 
driving fees were to be in addition to the tax on purchasing automobiles and fuel taxes, which 
were considered high. The new revenues were to follow the path of the existing transportation 
revenues and be put into the government‟s general budget and not allocated for reducing 
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congestion (Smith, 2009).  The Royal Dutch Touring Club (ANWB, the Automobile Association 
of the Netherlands), already feeling that the revenues from taxes on fuel and automobile 
purchases should be earmarked for transportation projects, saw this policy as unfair, and 
campaigned heavily against road pricing.  Its campaign, along with low public acceptance, 
caused the policy to stall (ibid).  
 
In 2005, the government created a panel called the “Nouwen Platform”.  It was 
comprised of business leaders, academics, and government officials to make recommendations 
on how to proceed with transportation financing (Van der Waard, 2008).  The panel mostly 
focused on alternatives to the current tax system.  By this time, Global Navigational Satellite 
Systems and On-Board Unit technology had progressed to the point that their use in road pricing 
pilot projects was practical (Grush, 2010a).  The panel advised the government to use this 
technology to create a kilometre charge to replace the taxes on vehicles purchases and ownership 
(ex. The vehicle purchase tax was 40% of the net list price).  The new kilometre charge would 
apply to the use of all roads in the country and vary depending on location, time of day, and 
emissions (Van der Waard, 2008).   
 
In, 2006, the Netherlands had a national election. It resulted in the formation of a center-
left coalition government headed by the Christian Democratic Appeal and followed by the 
Labour Party, and the Christian Union.  The Minister of Transportation, Camiel Eurlings, was a 
member of the Christian Democratic Appeal.  Eurlings approved of the recommendations made 
by the Nouwen Platform.  He was also in favour of fully hypothecating the “kilometre pricing” 
revenues into an infrastructure fund, so that all the taxes paid for using the transportation system 
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would be used to improve the system (Keken, 2009).  By 2007, Eurlings went on a mission to 
communicate the benefits of this €4 billion plan to the Dutch people.  He argued that half of 
drivers would end up paying less in vehicle charges in the new financing design, but the costs of 
the On Board Units that would have to be installed in every vehicle would mainly be borne by 
motorists.  Over privacy concerns, Eurlings promised that information collected about motoring 
habits would be 'legally and technically' protected and would not be accessible to other 
government agencies.  However, if the “security of the state” was at risk, or in the case of 
“prevention, detection and prosecution of criminal activity”, the police or the national 
intelligence agency could (virtually) spy into cars (Keken, 2009). Regardless of whether or not 
his mission was succeeding with the public, Eurlings still managed to start a 100,000-driver pilot 
project and won the approval of the governing coalition‟s cabinet over an implementation 
timeline, with all cars being subject to the charge by 2012 (Wright, 2009).  However, the Dutch 
legislature still had to approve the proposal in order to pave the way for implementation. 
 
Around the same time, the Automobile Association of the Netherlands, who viewed 
“kilometre pricing” as a fair way to charge for mobility (Smith, 2009), surveyed 200,000 
members and non-members about their opinions on the new policy (Graaf, 2010).  The 
Automobile Association of the Netherlands interpreted the survey‟s results and concluded that 
there was a significant level of distrust among the public towards the government on whether the 
policy could be implemented fairly and successfully (Haighton, 2010).  More specifically, survey 
participants felt that they will be paying more and that their privacy will be infringed – a 
sentiment exacerbated by the new security measures taken since 9/11. Further undermining the 
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government‟s credibility was its failure to finish major transportation projects on time and on 
budget (ibid).   
 
Simultaneously, the coalition government had been considering extending the Dutch 
military mission in Afghanistan at the request of the United States.  The Labour Party ardently 
opposed extending the mission, and withdrew from the coalition in February 2010, thereby 
dissolving the government and triggering an election (Grush, 2010a).  Public opinion was 
strongly against the coalition‟s leading party, the Christian Democratic Appeal, and a month 
later, Eurlings resigned as Transport minister and announced he would not run in the upcoming 
election (Ron, 2010).  The Ministry‟s new leaders, sensing a lack of political support for the 
kilometre charge, suspended all of its implementation activities (Ministerie van Verkeer en 
Waterstaat, 2010).  After the election, the new coalition, headed by the Netherlands right wing 
parties, decided to not implement the kilometre charge, and instead shift taxes towards fuel and 
away from vehicle registration and purchases (Grush, 2010a). Ironically, the new coalition used 
the phrase “kilometre pricing” to describe their policy of increased fuel taxes, the same phrase 
their political opponents used to promote its own policy in the past.  
 
The fact that the kilometre charge was a policy promoted by the previous government 
could have been reason enough for the new government, with its new ideology, to cancel it.  
However, the reasons explicitly given (that this very complicated policy was poorly 
communicated to the point that a majority of the public found it controversial and unacceptable) 
were reiterated by two supporters of the kilometre charge: the Automobile Association of the 
Netherlands and the Dutch trade association of car manufacturers 
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(http://www.kilometerheffingnederland.com/, 2010).  Even if the Labour Party had not left the 
coalition, its leading party, the Christian Democratic Appeal, had become unpopular and would 
have faced an election eventually. The period from 2006 to 2010 was not long enough for the 
government, and Minister Eurlings, to develop and communicate a policy to a point that it would 
be in the interests of the new government to carry on the work without interruption. It would 
appear that a restructuring of transport finances would take much longer than four years.  This is 
the sentiment of the next jurisdiction, whose story at present, may be only half way through.  
 
2.3 State of Oregon 
The State of Oregon has almost as many registered drivers and vehicles as it does 
population. In 2007, drivers travelled in state a total of 34.8 billion miles (Starr, 2010). 
Accommodating these drivers has been very expensive, causing huge difficulties for the state 
government to keep revenues in line with costs.   
 
The state has a unique transportation policy that uses its constitution to fully 
hypothecate gas taxes and other road revenues for the purposes of building and maintaining 
transportation infrastructure (Starr, 2010).  In the mid-1990s the tax rates were proving to be 
insufficient for the Oregon‟s transportation needs. The gas tax had not been raised since 1991 
(Lednicer, 1999).  A gas tax increase had failed in 1997.  By 1999 the pressure was on in the 
Republican-controlled state legislature to attempt another gas tax increase. During these 
deliberations, some lawmakers advocated for the Department of Transportation to provide the 
legislature with a detailed list of construction projects every two years, as a way to instil some 
accountability to a gas tax increase (ibid).  In July of 1999, the State passed a five cent increase 
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in the gas tax, but three months later, efforts were already underway to repeal it.  The Oregon-
Idaho chapter of the American Automobile Association, viewing the tax increase as unfair, 
pressed to put the issue on a ballot initiative for the primary election in the spring of 2000.  The 
ballot initiative was successfully created with the help of many Republicans who voted for the 
tax in the first place, and the tax increase was defeated by a margin of 7-to-1 (Charles, 2000).  
 
After the ballot initiative, it became clear to many in Oregon that the chances of 
increasing the gas tax in the near future were very slim.  However, at the same time the State still 
needed to improve its infrastructure (ibid). This fact was not lost on Democratic Governor 
Kitzhaber, who alluded to some important policy shifts in late 2000: that transportation demand 
management should be part of the debate, that the state should explore other ways of paying for 
road construction and repair without raising taxes, and that gas taxes (at the time paying for 70% 
of the transportation costs) were an unstable source of revenue (Lednicer, 2000).  At the same 
time, a right-wing think tank from California released a paper that was reported on by the 
Oregon media.  The paper advocated tolling cars to pay for roads and refunding drivers the 
appropriate amount of gas tax (Samuel, 2000).  Six months later, Republican State Senator Bruce 
Starr, Chairman of the Transportation Committee, put forward a bill (passed not long after) that 
would create a task force to study alternatives to the gas tax (The Oregonian, 2001). 
 
The “Road User Fee Task Force” was created under the Oregon Department of 
Transportation‟s direction.  The title of the task force acknowledged the perception that 
Oregonians were feeling over-taxed, and the phrase “user fee” was meant to show that it was 
working on something different than taxes (Zoner, 2002).  The law required the Road User Fee 
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Task Force to be composed of four members of the state legislature, four stakeholders (road user 
representatives, telecommunications industry, research community), appointed by the governor, 
one city and one county official (Whitty, 2007) By 2002, the Road User Fee Task Force held 
public hearings to report the hypothetical user fee options being considered: highway tolls, rush 
hour surcharges, and a satellite-based tolling system.  The expected backlash from the hearings‟ 
attendees about these proposals was rebutted by Starr who explained that the problem was 10-20 
years away when most vehicles are high mileage and some using alternative fuels (Stewart, 
2002). Some transportation officials in Oregon‟s largest city, Portland, were critics that argued 
that current efforts would best be put into raising the gas tax immediately since vehicle miles 
traveled in the city were increasing (ibid). Despite the critiques, the 2002 Oregon gubernational 
election transferred power from Kitzhaber, who was forced out by term limits, to his fellow 
Democrat, Ted Kulongoski.  Though the Republican candidate tried to make taxes a major 
election issue, the proposed road user fees was not one of them (Esteve, 2002). 
 
The Road User Fee Task Force continued its work and contracted with Oregon State 
University to develop “cost and qualitative functionality parameters for data and fee collection” 
(Whitty, 2007).  By 2004, the University had developed a system using GPS satellite signals to 
gauge a fee based on the amount of miles driven in Oregon.  The calculation and collection of 
the fee would occur at the vehicle‟s fueling station (Hortsch, 2004).  By the middle of 2006, a 
Portland-area pilot project had begun.  It involved almost 300 volunteer drivers who were paid 
$300 each to carry a GPS device in their car and fuel up at two participating gas stations (Mayer, 
2006).  The GPS recorded how many miles were traveled inside and outside Oregon, to ensure 
that only driving in the state was charged. The GPS also recorded miles traveled in the Portland 
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area during morning and afternoon rush hours, so the concept of congestion pricing could be 
tested. When a volunteer‟s car pulled into the gas station, a radio transmitter sent the mileage 
data to a reader in the gas pump. The mileage fee was added to the gas bill, and the gas tax was 
subtracted (Starr, 2010). During the pilot project, the gubernational election in the fall of 2006 
was held, and gave Kulongoski another victory.  The issue of paying for roads was a major issue, 
though the Road User Fee Task Force‟s work was not.  Kulongoski argued for the need to 
replace the gas tax, but stopped short of endorsing any specific proposal (Mayer, 2006).  
 
A year later, the Portland pilot project had finished.  Though there were some glitches 
with the technology, the overall mileage fee concept proved to work (Mayer, 2007).  
Kulongoski‟s 2009-11 budgets included $10 million to continue experiments on the technology.  
He was able to avoid the concerns about privacy protection and fee increases by stressing that 
such a mileage fee would not be ready for another ten years, and that these issues still need to be 
worked out (Walsh, 2009).  The fact that the proportion of the Oregon Department of 
Transportation‟s road budget from the gas tax had decreased from 70% to 60% over the last ten 
years gave credibility to the governor‟s argument that alternative revenues were needed (ibid).  
After reaching his consecutive term limit as governor, Kulongoski was succeeded by his 
predecessor, Kitzhaber, in the 2010 election.  
 
For over a decade the Oregon Government has retained its objective to seek a long-term 
gas tax alternative.  Its mileage fee concept is similar to the proposed kilometre charge in the 
Netherlands.  Oregon however, is far away from implementing this objective partly because it is 
hoping that vehicle manufacturers will begin including GPS technology in every vehicle, 
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embedding the cost to users/consumers (Whitty, 2007) (the Dutch Government was planning to 
require that all vehicle owners pay directly for most of this cost).  Oregon has managed so far to 
keep the mileage fee proposal away from being an election issue, but public concerns such as 
fairness, privacy, and perceptions of a large and costly bureaucracy, are likely to become voters‟ 
concerns at some future point in time.  At that time, the government will not be able to forever 
alleviate these concerns by saying “implementation will not occur for another ten years”.  
 
2.4 The Greater Toronto Area 
It could be argued that the modern transportation planning debate in the GTA began in 
the early 1970s when urban residents revolted in opposition to the construction of inner city 
expressways. The argument was that their land should not be paved over in order to allow more 
suburban commuters to bring their cars downtown (Vaughan, 1992).  In the early 1990s, the need 
to reduce automobile dependency was already recognized by the federal government. Through 
the departments of energy, transportation, and environment, the government gave grants to 
organizations such as the Canadian Urban Institute to develop land use and transportation 
planning strategies to meet this need (ibid). At the provincial level in the early 1990s, an NDP 
government was planning to build highway 407 north of Toronto, and pay for it using tolls via 
gantries that would scan license plates.  The government created a crown corporation to 
administer this project, as well as to explore the possibility of using this concept to finance future 
transportation infrastructure projects (Barber, 2005).  The tolled 407 highway was built relatively 
quickly, and temporarily alleviated congestion on surrounding highways until more vehicles 
entered the system.  In the 1995 provincial election, the Progressive Conservatives took power 
from the NDP, and later sold the 407 to a private company.  With this sale, the new owners 
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sought to raise the tolls to maximize profits, as opposed to achieving socially optimal congestion 
levels.  The increased fees irritated frequent users who were told by the previous government that 
the tolls would go to pay only for the highway itself (Borins, 2004). 
 
By the late 1990s, the work to solve the issues continued at the provincial level with the 
creation of the Greater Toronto Services Board, a body made up of the mayors of the GTA and 
some councillors of Metro Toronto.  Supported by the region‟s chambers of commerce, the 
Board‟s objective was to create a transportation plan for the region by the end of the decade.  
The Toronto Board of Trade urged the provincial government to give the Greater Toronto 
Services Board power to override municipal objections to future transportation initiatives, as 
well as to borrow and disburse for major projects (Toronto Star, 2001).  Unfortunately, the 
Province avoided making this decision by taking over responsibility for regional transportation 
planning.  The Greater Toronto Services Board, which had been studying congestion pricing 
options, was dissolved by its provincial creators soon after (James, 2001).   
 
Perhaps anticipating the fate of the Greater Toronto Services Board, the City of Toronto 
simultaneously proposed an official plan to massively expand the transit system and pay for it 
with either road tolls, vehicle registration fees, or parking levies (Maloney, 2000).  This was an 
indication that the City could no longer expect its provincial government to provide substantial 
funds for transportation.  This resulted in only minor transit improvements and no reform of 
transportation financing that would address congestion.   
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In the 2003 provincial election, the Liberal Party won power from the Progressive 
Conservatives.  However, a serious plan to improve the transportation system was not developed 
until years later with the creation of the Greater Toronto Transportation Authority (later renamed 
Metrolinx).  It did not take long after its creation for Metrolinx to create its Regional 
Transportation Plan (Regional Transportation Plan), consisting mainly of a series of linked 
transit projects.  However, a long term financing plan was not included, and the Province was 
questioned about from where the money would come.  Prior to the 2007 election, the Province 
stated that it did not support road tolls as part of a financing plan, and deferred such decisions to 
2013 (Manahan, 2008).  Metrolinx officially supported the decision to defer, contending that the 
public would be more receptive to new “revenue tools” once there are transit projects physically 
in place (ibid).  Unfortunately, the global economic recession delayed some of the Regional 
Transportation Plan‟s projects, and the inability of the Province to provide transit funding 
became more apparent.  In 2009, the Transportation Minister alluded to the lack of provincial 
funds by not ruling out road tolls as a possible future solution, saying Ontario citizens need to 
have an “intelligent conversation” about transit funding (Kalinowski, 2009).  This 
“conversation” did not take place before, or during the 2011 provincial election campaign, and it 
is unclear where and when it will start.   
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3.0 GNSS Road Pricing Technology 
During the private and public deliberations about road pricing in Ontario, a local 
company called Skymeter was working on a technology called “Financial-grade GPS”, a type of 
GNSS that meets the requirements of financial transactions and has been proven by the 
California Department of Transportation (www.tollroadsnews.com, 2009).  Skymeter can use 
On-board Units and satellites (without gantries) to meter vehicle use according to time, distance, 
and place.  An On-board Unit would record vehicle travel data, send it wirelessly to a “pricing 
proxy” to calculate a bill which is then sent to a tolling operator (Kalinowski, 2010).  Working in 
Toronto, the company, and others like it, have already been testing the technology in small 
projects around the world and could be part of a future congestion pricing scheme that is 
appropriate considering the physical characteristics of the GTA.   
There are varieties of GNSS metering technology being developed by different 
companies.  The technology that was to be used by the Netherlands, for example, uses the GNSS 
signal to determine reference points or „waypoints‟ in order to gather the route information 
(Custers & Kuiper, 2010).  For each trip an automobile takes, the waypoints are compared with a 
digital map that has all the pricing information for the different roads, and the trajectories 
travelled on each road is added together per price category.  The cost for each trip is then added 
for a total fee amount, and then transmitted to a central office for billing, fee collection and 
processing (ibid).  With this form or road pricing, distance-based congestion tolls could be 
applied throughout the GTA‟s transportation network on any routes that suffer routine 
congestion, and rates could vary depending on the time, the specific route, and even a vehicle‟s 
emissions levels (Sorensen, 2010). 
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The prices of satellite technologies can vary enormously. On-board Units, transponders, 
smart cards and toll facilities can have high implementation costs until they achieve economies 
of scale. However, they are convenient for users and also allow for easy price adjustments 
(Victoria Transport Policy Institute, 2010). Financial-grade GPS is relatively more expensive 
than the other communications technologies, yet they have much wider applications. Many 
drivers already use a GPS product in their car, and if such systems can be installed during vehicle 
manufacturing, the costs can decrease significantly (Sorensen & Taylor, 2006).  This is one of 
the methods by which Oregon‟s DOT hopes to pay for its mileage fee infrastructure. 
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4.0 Policy Options for Alleviating Congestion in the GTA 
Although this paper advocates for a GNSS-based road pricing option in the GTA, this 
chapter discusses the other various policy options that have been proposed for the GTA.  The 
discussion will be based on the compatibility of each option towards the specific transportation 
problems faced by the GTA. 
 
4.1 Gas Taxes 
Gas taxes, either raising current forms or creating local or regional forms, have been 
suggested as an alternative to tolling roads in order to solve the GTA‟s transportation problems 
(Toronto Board of Trade, 2010).  Increasing the tax or adding a new one and charging it at the 
pump is a relatively simple policy that is inexpensive to implement and administer.  It is a fee 
with which consumers are already familiar, and can theoretically generate large amounts of 
revenue for infrastructure (ibid).  However, there are several deficiencies when it comes to the 
idea of more gas taxes to help the GTA, because of the change in markets and policy goals.   
To begin with, the gas tax rate does not vary based on levels of congestion or location or 
time of day.  Even if a higher gas tax would give an incentive to drive less, there would not be an 
incentive to avoid driving on congested roads, hence the perception that roads are „free‟ (Peters, 
2008). Moreover, the gas tax may not be as effective at reducing vehicle miles travelled as it 
used to be.  This is so because, as the price of fuel has risen over the years, studies have shown 
that the price elasticity is shrinking (von Haefen, 2011).  This means that drivers are no longer 
reducing their road use as much as fuel prices are increasing.  It is likely that most drivers have a 
minimum amount of distance to drive regularly (such as the distance to work and back), a 
distance no fuel price increase can easily shorten.  Furthermore, vehicles using alternative fuels 
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are becoming more affordable and are beginning to find niche markets in urban areas.  This 
means that even if fuel prices continue to rise considerably, vehicle miles travelled may still rise 
over the long term, causing further congestion (Grush, 2011a).   
 
Lastly, but still very important, is the deficiency of the gas tax due to the ongoing 
improvements in vehicle fuel efficiency.  By both government and market forces, the fuel 
efficiency of motor vehicles has steadily increased in the last few decades (Peters, 2008).  As less 
gas is consumed by these vehicles, there will be less tax revenue to fund transportation services.  
In Oregon, this has been apparent for years, as the auto fleet's increasing fuel efficiency has 
reduced per-mile fuel-tax revenues by about $10 billion since 1985 (Landauer, 2002).  Mills 
estimates that average fuel efficiency for light and medium weight vehicles will increase by 
approximately 25% in the next 25 years (Mills, 2010).  This indicates that the gas tax may be a 
sub-par revenue generator, considering the rigorous attention needed to improve the GTA‟s 
transportation system. 
 
It is clear that an alternative to the gas tax is needed and some form of directly pricing 
road use, in a way that is sensitive to the scarcity of peak road capacity.  Such a form of road 
pricing could address congestion, while indirectly raising substantial amounts of revenue for 
transportation infrastructure.  It is expected that opponents to such a policy would argue that 
voters would not accept new charges. If that is the case, then voters would not accept higher gas 
taxes either. It is true that, for example, the introduction of the HST has affected Ontario public 
opinion polls and caused fewer respondents to approve of taxes in the province (Neuman, 2011). 
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Voters, more or less, did however, accept this tax by re-electing the government that 
implemented it, and it is impossible to know what voters will accept in the future.   
 
4.2 Options to Charge Directly for Road Use 
There is no doubt that implementing road pricing in the GTA will take a lot of work.  
This work could begin with choosing what type of road pricing would be best for the region. 
Electronic road pricing has become the dominant pricing method in new and emerging schemes. 
As of 2006, there were over 90 implemented or proposed electronic road pricing projects around 
the world, including highway tolls (like the GTA‟s Highway 407) and cordon tolls.  Maphangoh 
has argued for a cordon-based pricing system as a form of road pricing in Toronto.  In cordon-
based pricing, vehicles are charged upon entering a particular area, usually a central urban area 
that normally experiences high levels of congestion (Maphangoh, 2004).  Cordon tolls have been 
implemented in cities such as London and Stockholm but there are reasons why it would not be 
appropriate for the GTA. 
The GTA is surrounded by the Ontario Greenbelt, almost two million acres of 
permanently protected land established in 2005 (Carter-Whitney & Esakin, 2010).  The 
Greenbelt was created in response to the rise of urban sprawl in the GTA. From 1986 to 2001, 
approximately 75% of the growth population and employment has occurred in the regions 
surrounding the City of Toronto (IBI Group, 2007).  Transportation demand trends show that 
trips from the suburbs to Toronto has increased 45%, but more importantly, trips from Toronto to 
the suburbs, between the suburbs and within the suburbs has increased 127% (ibid).  This 
increase in economic activity and the associated sprawl, along with other land use and 
transportation planning decisions, has shaped the travel patterns of the GTA‟s vehicles to create 
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congestion that is largely decentralized (City of Toronto, 2000).  By contrast with Toronto, 
London‟s congestion is mainly centralized in the core, providing an appropriate place to create a 
cordon.   
A cordon surrounding Toronto would only target some of the GTA‟s congestion.  
Another problem with implementing cordon tolls is the need to build perimeter gantries for entry 
and exit points around the core.  This challenge was relatively small in Stockholm, whose core is 
on a large island, requiring gantries to be built only on the bridges connecting the city to the 
suburbs (Schuitema et al, 2010).  By contrast, Toronto has many routes that vehicles can take to 
enter the downtown, making the building of perimeter gantries unreasonably difficult.  Lastly, 
studies have shown that by creating a cordon and making travel outside it cheaper, businesses are 
given an incentive to move from inside the cordon to outside (Anas, 2010).  Encouraging sprawl 
through cordon pricing would therefore contradict the policy goals sought-after with the creation 
of the Greenbelt.  
The decision-making process involves not only choosing where to charge drivers but 
also how to charge drivers.  In some cases, certain charging methods can allow decision-makers 
to choose from a larger set of options.  
 
4.3 Technology Options 
Many of the underlying technologies to support electronic road pricing have matured in 
recent years. This has enabled governments to adjust fees based on vehicle characteristics and 
travel characteristics, and implement other kinds of road pricing projects such as automated 
weight-distance truck tolls, and distance-based user fees spanning entire road networks 
(Sorensen & Taylor, 2006). 
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Within the realm of electronic road pricing, communications technologies have also 
greatly matured.  Such technologies include electronic transponders that are placed inside a 
vehicle and are counted each time the vehicle passes a roadside sensor, and smart cards, which 
are placed inside the transponder, and are charged with a certain dollar value (Sorensen & 
Taylor, 2006).  Less than ten years ago, 407ETR began to use a technology called Radio 
Frequency Identification to toll the highway because its products were benefiting from 
economies of scale and the prices had significantly dropped.  The Radio Frequency Identification 
receivers, in fixed locations, capture driver information from the Radio Frequency Identification 
transponders inside the vehicles as they drive by.  This streamlined the billing process, reduced 
operation costs and allowed the company to charge users less (www.407etr.com).   
 
Radio Frequency Identification is currently used in countless road pricing systems 
around the world, but the problem with Radio Frequency Identification lies with its need to 
install large gantries over roads (Grush, 2010b).  The need for overhead gantries means only 
certain roads can be tolled. Unless gantries are built over every single road, drivers will take a 
non-tolled route. This creates an element of inflexibility that weakens the incentive to change a 
motorist‟s behaviour.  Congestion can regularly occur in many places in the GTA, from the 
Toronto‟s suburban thoroughfares to the streets of downtown Ajax, to Highway 401.  Negative 
externalities are produced in all of these places of congestion, and therefore should be equal 
policy targets.  Simply tolling some areas known for heavy traffic can just push congestion 
somewhere else. Pricing these new congested areas by building new infrastructure would cost 
more in time and money.  Traffic congestion is a “wicked problem” in that, attempting to solve it 
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can reveal or create other problems (Grush, 2010c).  The road pricing design that the GTA 
should adopt should be one that minimizes that amount of new problems it reveals or creates.   
 
4.4 Area-wide & Distance-based Pricing 
In 2003, Germany implemented a tolling system for trucks using satellite technology, 
similar to what many cellphone companies use.  Trucks are required to have a certified agency 
install a government-purchased On-board Unit, and are tolled when using major German 
highways, according to distance traveled, number of axles, and vehicle emissions rating, and 
enforced by gantries (TRB, 2009).  The toll rate is determined by calculating the costs that trucks 
incur through extra wear and tear on roads, and the revenue is collected by the same agency that 
installed the On-board Unit.  The German government at the time lauded the policy because such 
a tolling system was without precedent, and therefore was thought to potentially boost German 
innovation (Victoria Transport Policy Institute, 2011).  The technology being used was created in 
the previous decade and was not perfect.  Yet satellite technology has benefited from years of 
research and development since then.  Improved satellite technology, with the ability to toll all 
roads, could be considerably more appropriate for the GTA than the other options mentioned 
above. 
 
4.5 Implementing GNSS Road Pricing in the GTA 
Up until the present, much of the public discourse on road pricing in the GTA has 
spawned from the need to provide massive amounts of funding for public transit (Grush, 2008).  
Fortunately, a GTA-wide road pricing policy that targets congestion via GNSS and On-board 
Units can provide sufficient revenue negating the need for the existing transportation funding 
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methods.  Such a policy, however, cannot be implemented in the short term.  The experience 
from the Netherlands suggests that even a few years may be too short a period to properly 
develop a policy that is politically acceptable.  The experience from Oregon suggests that such 
technologies can benefit from lots of testing and exposure in the public eye, especially when 
privacy concerns remain strong.  For these reasons, it is sensible to expect that such a pricing 
system could not be fully implemented in the GTA for at least ten years.  This is not good news 
for automobile commuters, but short term congestion reduction policies could also be 
implemented as long as they do not interfere with the long-term plan.  For current and future 
transit users, this rough timeline could compliment what Metrolinx has calculated will be the 
total costs for capital, operation and maintenance, and rehabilitation in the Regional 
Transportation Plan and beyond.  In the “Draft Investment Strategy”, Metrolinx estimates that 
peak annual costs will occur around 2028, and remain high in the years beyond compared to the 
period of 2008-2018 (Metrolinx, 2008).  In this earlier period, funds for transportation services 
could be acquired by borrowing against future revenues from road pricing.  Soberman argues 
that the best way to fund transit is through guaranteed streams over predictable time periods 
(Soberman, 2010).  This means that if a new revenue generating mechanism is supported by a 
legislative commitment, Metrolinx could take out loans or issue bonds for short term funding 
(ibid).   
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5.0 Hurdles and the Options to Overcome them 
The phrase “legislative commitment” in the last section is not only an important one in 
this paper; it represents the goal of this paper.  The remainder of the paper will discuss the major 
hurdles that exist on the path to achieving a legislative commitment to GNSS pricing in the 
GTA.  Those hurdles are: managing the cost, privacy concerns caused by the technology, gaining 
acceptance to the direct pricing of roads and gaining an agreement between all GTA 
governments on the policy priorities. The following chapters will assess the extent of these 
hurdles, and provides strategies to overcome them. 
 
5.1 Hurdle # 1:  Privacy Concerns 
In the earlier discussion about the Netherlands‟ recent road pricing experience, it was 
mentioned that one of the reasons for public opposition to the policy was the fear that the 
government would use the technology to encroach on private lives.  It could be argued that since 
the rise of national security priorities over international and domestic terrorism concerns, citizens 
have become apprehensive about the potential of their respective governments to spy on them.  
Moreover, the rapid technological innovation of smart phones and social networking has created 
the perception that invading someone‟s privacy is much easier than it used to be.  
Despite the credibility (or lack thereof) of the possibility of a Canadian government‟s 
interest in tracking the movements of its motorists, GNSS On-board Units could technically 
provide information about where and when a vehicle has travelled.  The American Civil 
Liberties Association believes that because the technology is capable of providing information, 
both law enforcement and intelligence agencies will obtain and use the information (NewsHour 
with Jim Lehrer, 2009). 
34 
 
It is quite reasonable for people to want their movements and driving history to be kept 
private, even if it is also true that other types of personal information are given to credit card, 
insurance, and cell phone companies (Whitty, 2007).  In the telecommunications industry, the 
strong aversion to privacy invasion led to the creation of the International Working Group on 
Data Protection in Telecommunications.  Mindful of how citizens can distrust their governments 
in general, let alone distrust the advocacy of road pricing, the Working Group created guidelines 
to protect privacy for road pricing systems designers: 
- “The anonymity of the driver can and should be preserved by using the so-called 
smartclient or anonymous proxy approaches that keep personal data of the drivers under their
 sole control and do not require off-board location record-keeping.” 
- “Road pricing systems can and should be designed so that the detailed trip data 
are fully and permanently deleted from the system after the charges have been settled in order to 
prevent the creation of movement profiles or the potential for function-creep.” 
- “Processing of personal data for other purposes (e.g. pay-as you drive insurance 
or behavioural- based marketing), should only be possible with clear and unambiguous consent 
from the individual.” 
- “In terms of enforcement, the system should not ascertain the identity of the 
driver or owner of a vehicle unless there is evidence that the driver has committed something 
which is defined as a violation of the road pricing system.” (IWGDPT, 2009) 
It is the case that many road pricing technologies, such as Radio Frequency 
Identification, require roadside equipment that in some way identifies and records the presence 
and location of a vehicle as it passes by and charges an account associated with that vehicle 
(Grush, 2010b).  GNSS devices do have the ability to show the precise location of a vehicle on a 
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map (just like the GPS products now common on dashboards). However, not all GNSS On-board 
Units are alike. Some kinds of units are more likely to store information (such as a vehicle‟s 
precise location) in the vehicle itself. This would alter the On-board Unit‟s relationship with a 
central administration office, and thus address the privacy concerns. 
GNSS On-board Units differ in their level of autonomy, meaning how much 
information is processed in the On-board Unit and whether the data is stored and analyzed in the 
On-board Unit or in the central office, and whether the same occurs for each stage of the billing 
process (Custers & Kuiper, 2010).  The basic issue in the debate over privacy in GNSS On-board 
Units is the fact that even though detailed travel data about a vehicle are not accessible to third 
parties, there has to be access for the vehicle owner/user for transparency reasons, and for the 
supervising authority for enforcement reasons (Grush, 2010b).   
 
 
5.2 On-board Units Options and their Privacy Assessments 
To address the privacy concerns, there are four options. Option one is a “Thin” On-board 
Unit. The Thin On-board Unit contains only the ability to determine the location and an 
electronic identity (probably the license plate). The waypoints, along with the identity of the 
vehicle, are transmitted to the central office, where the information is extracted and processed for 
pricing. The road segments are priced at the central office using a price table and aggregated per 
category. The price tables are centrally stored and can easily be modified for all drivers at the 
same time (Custers & Kuiper, 2010).  Under this option, all data are transferred to the central 
office immediately after collection. The user cannot see what is happening with his or her data 
inside the On-board Unit.   
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Option one has drawbacks but there are ways to address them.  For example, to make the 
process more transparent, an arrangement could be created where users could log onto a personal 
page and check their route data. Were this done, encrypted data would be sent to the central 
office which creates a privacy concern if people there are able to view it. Encrypting data would 
solve provide employees of the central office only with access to data they needed to know for 
their tasks (Custers & Kuiper, 2010).  
 
The second option to address privacy concerns is the “Slim” On-board Unit. The Slim 
On-board Unit collects a series of positions and aggregates these to a route using a digital route 
map. Instead of 25 separate waypoints on one route, the On-board Unit notes only that a road 
was used by a vehicle between a particular starting point and an endpoint. The amount of 
information to be transferred is reduced considerably. The route information is transferred to the 
central office together with the vehicle identity.  This is done periodically, or at the end of each 
trip. The road segments are aggregated and priced in the central office (Custers & Kuiper, 2010).  
  
The Slim On-board Unit results in much less data sent to the central office than the Thin 
On-board Unit discussed above. Nevertheless, for enforcement purposes, the registration of 
waypoints still needs to be stored in the On-board Unit to enable comparison checks with the 
central office (Custers & Kuiper, 2010). In short, privacy concerns are alleviated but not 
eliminated.  
The third option is the  “Smart” On-board Unit. The Smart On-board Unit, the type of 
product created at Skymeter, has a digital route map onboard.  It processes a series of location 
targets to a route. The road use is calculated on a per road basis.  The information is transferred 
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in the same way as the Slim and Thin On-board Units, to a central office.  The pricing and fee 
collection takes place at the central office (Custers & Kuiper, 2010). 
In the third option, location data does not leave the vehicle. It cannot be used 
information for other purposes, such as browsing the data for patterns. However, its advantage 
may also be a disadvantage.  The use of the Smart On-board Unit may hinder the ability to 
predict traffic jams or provide information for road maintenance organizations. Furthermore, any 
errors cannot be rectified by the central office straightaway. The vehicle may have to visit a 
service location to get information corrected (Custers & Kuiper, 2010). However, with option 
four, a market for multiple services can be created.  Private operators can offer additional 
applications, beyond that of metering road use (to be discussed further, later in the chapter).  
 
The fourth option is the “Thick” On-board Unit. The Thick On-board Unit encompasses 
all functions in the metering process, starting with the location determination, processing a series 
of location determinations to a route and calculating the price. Like the Smart On-board Unit, the 
Thick On-board Unit has a digital route map onboard.  It contains pricing data.  A fee is 
determined for each trip. The main difference between the Smart and the Thick On-board Unit is 
that the Thick On-board Unit has a payment option. There is a digital purse onboard with a 
balance that can be charged (Custers & Kuiper, 2010).  
The Thick On-board Unit does not provide central access to vehicle location data, thus 
alleviating the privacy concerns. The onboard payment option provides more sense of privacy for 
the user, as users may check all payments directly. The Thick On-board Unit does create an issue 
with regard to enforcement however. The Thick On-board Unit is more susceptible to fraud.  In 
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this connection, it is useful to note that cell phone service providers have not added payment 
options to their devices (Custers & Kuiper, 2010).  
None of the above options is perfect but some have more shortcomings than others 
when it comes to privacy concerns. However, other measures can be taken to reduce privacy 
concerns.   They include making the data anonymous at several stages of the metering process; 
that is, anonymous until the bill has to be sent to a specific individual.  Legal measures could 
also be enacted that determine what data are collected and processed, how data making occurs, 
and by whom (Custers & Kuiper, 2010).  
The Smart and Thick On-board Units are the preferred options, not just because of 
likeliness to overcome privacy concerns, but also to overcome the hurdle of how to pay for them. 
 
5.3 Hurdle # 2:  Costs of the GNSS and On-board Unit Infrastructure 
One could argue that, while GNSS-based road pricing can be effective, the current 
prices of the infrastructure (mainly the On-board Units) are much too high.  Average prices for 
Smart and Thick On-board Units are around $150 dollars each (Grush, 2011b).  For the 
government to equip every vehicle in the GTA with an On-board Unit would cost hundreds of 
millions of dollars. This is money Ontario governments cannot easily allocate, especially for a 
controversial road pricing program.  It is likely that the hurdle of cost contributed to the demise 
of the program in the Netherlands.  Then can GNSS-based road pricing be implemented?  In the 
United States, an effort to answer this question is being made by the Transportation Research 
Board.  The Board hired Paul Sorensen from the Rand Corporation to report on the best ways to 
develop system trials for mileage-based road pricing.  
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In the Rand Corporation report, consideration of “vehicle miles travelled fees” was said 
to be motivated by the recent “erosion” of fuel tax revenue. Tax rates have failed to be raised to 
offset the effects of inflation and improved fuel economy (Sorensen, 2010).  Though relatively 
simple vehicle miles travelled fee systems can be designed to solely provide a stable source of 
revenue, more sophisticated systems can also achieve additional policy goals such as reducing 
congestion and harmful emissions, and providing a range of value-added services for the driver 
through the Smart or Thick On-board Units (ibid). The mentioning of the last policy goal, 
providing value-added services, is what makes Sorensen‟s road pricing document different than 
most others.  Only in recent years, with the improvement of GNSS and On-board Unit 
technology, has this policy goal of providing value added services become possible.   
There are several possible value added services. 
Motorists with a GNSS On-board Unit in their vehicle could have the benefit of a pay-
as-you-drive insurance policy.  Automobile insurance payments are made annually and monthly. 
Insurance premiums are currently determined by address, driving record, gender, self-declaration 
of average distance traveled, and possibly other demographic variables, but almost never by the 
most important indicator of risk - actual distance traveled. 
The concept of Pay As You Drive car insurance stems from the argument that the cost 
structure of owning a car is designed so that most of the fixed costs are paid upfront. Drivers 
must purchase the car itself, pay a yearly registration fee, and pay a fixed monthly amount in 
insurance (Victoria Transport Policy Institute, 2010). By contrast, the cost of driving each 
kilometre is relatively very low. There is little financial disincentive to drive because of 
insurance premiums (Greenberg, 2009). Using GNSS technology, Pay As You Drive car 
insurance could prorate premiums by mileage.  Mileage then becomes a variable cost, giving 
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drivers an incentive to drive less, or rewarding lower mileage drivers with perhaps as much as 
several hundred dollars per year (Sorensen, 2010).   
A study by the Brookings Institution found that, if all car insurance was converted to 
Pay As You Drive, the reduction in crash claims would be disproportionately lower. In addition, 
there would be billions of dollars saved in “social benefits”, and sixty-four percent of households 
would experience savings, amounting to an average of $270 per vehicle (Greenberg, 2009). The 
Brookings Institute study assumes a given price for driving.  This price may not be one that 
targets congestion specifically unless of course, prices vary according to time and place.  
Pay As You Drive insurance is unlikely to be mandated under provincial or federal law, 
but it can be promoted as an excellent compliment to pricing congestion.  Moreover, Pay As You 
Drive insurance could be applied to distance travelled only (like most applications to date), or 
applied to time and location of travel reflecting the fact that collisions, thefts, and the like are 
more probably in certain areas than in others (Sorensen, 2010). 
Another value added services relates to parking.  Underpriced parking is common, a 
principled cause of undersupply. It is a contributor to traffic congestion.  Drivers circle streets 
repeatedly to find an available spot (Grush, 2010c).  Advanced (ie Smart and Thick) On-board 
Units could locate nearby vacant parking spots and also determine the specific location in which 
a vehicle is parked, thus allowing for automated parking payments. 
 
In many circumstances, the act of payment of street-curb parking is far more painful to 
drivers than is the actual expenditure itself, especially when one has to worry about being fined 
by parking enforcement or paying more than the time parked required.  With automated parking 
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payments, drivers would avoid fines and pay only for the time they occupy the parking space 
(Sorensen, 2010). 
Another value added services involves “peer-to-peer car sharing”. Peer-to-peer car-
sharing involves having automobile owners sharing their cars with neighbours without having to 
physically exchange keys or buy a car-storage depot (Grush, 2011c).  In order for this to work, 
there must be mutual trust between owner and renter.  The necessary ingredient is trust as this is 
a private transaction.  Trust can come from GNSS Thick On-board Units that measure driving 
behaviour and the associated fees, calculate the fees and send electronic bills (ibid).  
Finally, GNSS On-board Unit technology can make GPS navigation more sophisticated, 
suggesting travel routes based on real time traffic conditions, construction detours, accidents or 
any other alerts.  It could also provide an internet connection, safety features such as alerting the 
driver of school zones or hazardous patches of roadway, or provide warnings of imminent 
potential collisions due to merging or suddenly stopping vehicles (Sorensen, 2010).  
It is because GNSS On-board Units have extensive value added capabilities, the costs of 
purchasing them and installing them in every vehicle can be quite high. 
 In his report, Sorensen outlines three possible ways to deploy the On-board Unit 
infrastructure into vehicles in order to begin levying vehicle miles travelled fees.  The first 
approach requires that all vehicles be retrofitted with the On-board Unit.  This approach was 
considered by the Dutch government in their kilometre charging scheme.  The high degree of 
public opposition in the Netherlands to this approach probably contributed to the demise of the 
scheme. The second approach mandates auto manufacturers to install the On-board Units into 
new vehicles. This second approach was considered by the Oregon Department of Transportation 
during the mileage fee trials in Oregon.  Oregon has found there are drawbacks to this type of 
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deployment.  First, in order to minimize the length of time to replace the entire vehicle fleet with 
a new one containing On-board Units, the public policy decision to mandate manufacturers to 
install On-board Units (and thus introducing vehicle miles travelled fees) would have to happen 
as soon as possible. Such a clear policy decision would first require sufficient public support. 
The Oregon experience suggests that public support is not easily guaranteed.  Second, GNSS 
technology has evolved rapidly in recent years and will probably continue to do so, suggesting 
that it might be premature to settle on a standardized type of On-board Unit for all vehicles in the 
near term (Sorensen, 2010).   
 
One could argue that using “thinner” and less expensive types of On-board Units, such 
as those used in the Oregon trial, would better help overcome the cost hurdle, it is in fact 
misleading.  Grush contends that the operational costs of GNSS tolling can actually be less using 
with Thick or Smart types of On-board Units. Even though the cost of the physical product is 
higher, the telecommunication and central administration costs of the Thick system are much 
lower (Grush, 2011b).   
 
5.4 Voluntary Opt In Approach 
A third infrastructure-deployment approach involves a voluntary opt-in.  By installing 
the On-board Unit in one‟s vehicle, road users would pay optional fees initially.  Oregon used a 
voluntary opt in approach in their first mileage fee trials. It did so by paying a few hundred 
volunteers to test the technology.  In addition to the benefits of the Oregon trial, a volunteer opt 
in approach would provide greater incentive by offering a range of value-added services 
(Sorensen, 2010).  To add credibility to the voluntary opt in, on May 11, 2011 the New York 
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City Department of Transportation formally issued a Request for Expressions of Interest, inviting 
companies to give insights about ways to provide “driver benefits through in‐vehicle and 
communications technologies, software applications and related components to afford a range of 
services such as customized information on travel choices and cost; real‐time travel conditions; 
personalized feedback on recent trip‐making, and to support pay‐as‐you-drive insurance and 
integration of social networking and crowd sourcing” (NYCDOT, 2011).  New York City made 
this request in the hopes to help travelers make better use of its extensive multimodal 
transportation systems and in the process improve the overall efficiency of system operations 
(NYCDOT, 2011). 
 
In vehicle miles travelled-fee trials in the United States, the approach has been to 
contract with a single firm or consortium for them to provide the technology and infrastructure.  
A single provider system provides for competition during the bidding phase however motivation 
for continued efforts to innovate and reduce costs is often lost once the single provider contract 
has been awarded.  
 
To resolve the problems associated with a single provider, the voluntary opt-in approach 
could employ the concept of interoperability. Multiple firms could continually compete in a 
market for the provision of metering and billing services. Third parties could compete to provide 
value added applications.  Interoperability all would likely drive down costs and stimulate 
innovation (Sorensen, 2010). Governments can still shape the market.  They would do so by 
setting technology standards with a minimal set of functional requirements. Such standards 
might include accurate meter capability (according to time, distance and place), protecting data 
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through during storage and transmission. With a volunteer opt in system motorists would have a 
wide variety of choices: technology vendors, services providers, and additional value-added 
services described above (Sorensen, 2010).  Meanwhile, under the voluntary opt in system, 
drivers could choose any variation on the basic fee structure, even a flat rate.  Drivers could also 
choose to receive discounts and convenient payment methods if they opt for a “thicker” On-
board Unit, reducing operating costs, in exchange giving up a degree of privacy. 
Sorensen envisions what initially is an informal trial of the voluntary opt in approach.  
In such a case, the market is created and regulated by the government.  However, a voluntary opt 
in approach, as opposed to mandated one, would reduce costs to the government. It would 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the GNSS On-board Unit technology.  As the amount of 
volunteers increase, a legislative commitment to GNSS road pricing would become more viable.   
This voluntary opt in approach, however, is not without its drawbacks.  An informal, 
market-based trial has never been tried before.  Governments have no experience from which to 
draw.  The informal aspect would mean that the government did not have full control over the 
trial.  A degree of co-management between the public and private sectors would be necessary.  
Competing interests could lead to conflict (Sorensen, 2010).  Lastly, it is possible that drivers 
may not be interested in a voluntary opt in.  They may not want to be part of any vehicle miles 
travelled fee program. They may not care for value added services, because they already have 
free parking options.  A lack of volunteers may make firms fearful of investing into a brand new 
market, and the informal trial would be weak. 
To address these drawbacks, Sorensen suggests creating two vehicle miles travelled 
programs; one voluntary for passenger vehicles, the other mandatory for commercial vehicles 
(Sorensen, 2010).  Grush suggests that the introduction of vehicle miles travelled fees could be 
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put off for a few years until the market for the other value added services is viable. Grush‟s 
suggestion requires that government be involved in an initial stage.  Selling a few licences to 
firms to enter the market in exchange for their contracted responsibility to protect privacy and 
provide accurate vehicle miles travelled data (Grush, 2010d).  In this way, firms would have a 
degree of market protection, encouraging them to invest significantly in the market for 
applications.   
 
Another way to reduce costs by creating incentives for drivers to volunteer is parking 
reform.  Parking reform is already being promoted by Ontario‟s Ministry of Transportation, as 
evidence by their 2011 release of guidelines (drawn from other jurisdictions) for municipalities 
to improve their public transit systems.  In the guidelines, the Ministry of Transportation 
encourages municipalities to: 
- encourage employers to reduce the amount of free parking for employees 
- reduce parking availability and increase fees in municipal lots and streets, and 
- implement more dynamic parking rates (i.e. based on time of day) to achieve 
desired levels of demand (MTO, 2011).  
 
It is possible that the Ministry of Transportation is making these suggestions as a way of 
addressing the regional transportation problems.  Charging motorists for parking spots at work is 
an easy way to alter drivers‟ behaviour without too much negative backlash. Drivers are already 
accustomed to paying for parking, unlike road tolls (Victoria Transport Policy Institute, 2011). In 
Toronto, a large payment disparity exists between on-street and off-street (garage) parking. This 
disparity causes drivers to repeatedly circle around city blocks seeking cheap spots.  The result is 
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unnecessary congestion.  Parking management also requires physical meters and manual 
enforcement staff.  It is only financially viable to conduct in areas of high demand (Grush, 
2010c).  Licensing parking authorities to collect fees through GNSS On-board Units would 
reduce operating costs to parking management. 
The voluntary opt in approach is based on the presumption that volunteers will join 
when the costs of value added services decreases. Furthermore, if the number of opt ins 
increases, parking management can be reformed even further.  Parking authorities can expand 
their metering to areas with lower demand.  In its guideline report, The Ministry of 
Transportation also encourages municipalities to “leverage parking assets into revenue” meaning 
there is potential revenue to be collected for every non-charged parking space (MTO, 2011).  
GNSS On-board Unit technology can eventually allow parking authorities to expand their 
metering in low demand areas while reducing their overall expenses (Grush, 2010e).   
A voluntary opt in approach can use private money to finance the GNSS infrastructure.  
This approach, can also demonstrate the effectiveness of the technology and its ability to protect 
privacy and provide value added services to motorists.  Reformed parking management can 
create greater incentives for motorists to join the GNSS On-board Unit market, driving costs 
down further.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
6.0 Analysis 
6.1 Analysis of the Arguments Against Road Pricing 
As time goes on, the government will have a chance to implement GTA-wide or 
province-wide GNSS tolling in order to finance the transportation system and manage 
congestion. Implementation legislation will require sufficient acceptance of GNSS tolling by 
Ontario politicians and their constituents.  During the public debate about such legislation, it is 
expected that the opponents of road pricing will make the arguments they have made in the past. 
The only modern experience the GTA has with accepting a road pricing scheme was the 
building of Highway 407 north of Toronto as a toll route in the 1990s.  The Ministry of 
Transportation proposed implementing tolls on the new highway as a method of paying for its 
construction and removing these same tolls upon completion (Borins & Mylvaganam, 2004).  
Though the Ministry of Transportation feared that the Ontario Treasury Board would not permit 
them to divert the tolls away from the general revenues, the Premier at the time, Bob Rae, 
approved the idea in 1993. A crown corporation was created to administer and accelerate 
Highway 407‟s construction.  The initiative won the approval of one of the largest transportation 
stakeholders, the Canadian Automobile Association, largely because the aim was to expand road 
capacity (ibid).   
 
When the Conservatives took power in 1995 in Ontario, there was opposition to the idea 
of having a crown corporation involved in transportation financing and policy development.  As 
an alternative, the Conservative government proposed privatizing Highway 407.  It contended 
that the tolls would probably decrease in this scenario.  The Canadian Automobile Association 
was opposed to privatization. It accused the government of breaking its promise to remove the 
48 
 
tolls when construction was completed. It correctly predicted that the tolls would actually rise 
with privatization.  
Since the privatization of Highway 407, the Canadian Automobile Association has been 
one of the most consistent organized opponents to road pricing in the GTA (Kitchen, 2008).  
Most Toronto newspaper articles on the subject support the Canadian Automobile Association‟s 
position that motorists are already overburdened by fuel taxes and other fees.  Because money is 
not fully allocated for transportation, motorists should not have to pay in tolls (Theobald, 2003).  
The history of transportation funding will show that the amount revenue from driving 
related taxes is currently insufficient. Early in the twentieth century, cities used property taxes to 
fund improvements to their local transportation system such as widening streets and installing 
traffic signals. City property taxes made sense because these transportation measures linked 
homes and businesses raising the value of them.   As time went on, the population grew and the 
automobile could travel farther distances.  There became a demand for freeway systems.  
However, cities were not rich enough to build freeways nor was this appropriate because 
freeways affect property values across entire regions (Brown, Morris & Taylor, 2009).  The 
revenue raised was insufficient, and a gas tax was added instead.  A gas tax was simple and 
cheap to administer.  It was successful because revenues were resilient even in tough economic 
times when fuel consumption continued to rise (ibid).  However, despite large gas tax revenues, 
the costs of roads were still growing, and they were paid for by general government funds 
(Toljagic, 2009).  When public transit services were introduced, they were paid for in much the 
same manner, except also with fares paid by transit riders. While the taxes drivers pay on fuel are 
not dedicated to transportation, the total costs of road and transit services continue to grow, and 
cannot be fully funded by gas and property taxes.  
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I would argue that the Canadian Automobile Association‟s argument that drivers 
already pay enough for roads is incorrect. However earmarking all the gas tax revenue to fund all 
transportation services would provide some government transparency.  In order for the Ontario 
Treasury Board to approve earmarking the gas tax, the effect on the provincial budget would 
have to be neutral.  Other provincial transfers to municipalities might have to be reduced, or 
some public services might have to be downloaded.  At the same time, municipalities would be 
less dependent on property taxes for transportation because the gas tax would yield a greater 
share of the funding. Therefore, the effect on municipal budgets could also be neutral. If GNSS 
road pricing were to be introduced, rates could be set so that the tax shift was revenue positive 
for both the Province and the GTA (the relationship between money and governance will be 
discussed later in the analysis). 
 
There are precedents for earmarking gas taxes.  The State of Oregon took action thirty 
years ago when a constitutional amendment was passed that limited the use of fuel taxes to 
transportation purposes.  The Province of Manitoba passed a similar law with the Gas Tax 
Accountability Act in 2004 (Gaudet, 2008).  It is often claimed that drivers in Ontario are 
displeased with the current state of taxes (Neuman, 2010).  A gas tax may be one of the more 
despised taxes in Ontario because it has not been increased since 1992 (Ministry of Finance, 
2011).  Fortunately, GNSS tolling can replace the gas tax in the future.   
Another prominent argument against road pricing is based on the issue of fairness.  In 
the past, road pricing proposals involved charging for the use of only some roads or entering a 
cordon.  Opponents claimed that the burden of paying for roads would be unevenly distributed if 
one of the options discussed above would be implemented.  Yet one could argue that this is 
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already the case for the drivers of fuel-efficient or alternative vehicles. They do not pay much 
gas tax.  With GNSS road pricing, the argument of unfairness would not hold because what 
drivers would pay would be in proportion to extent of their road use (Grush, 2010b).   
Road pricing opponents can also claim that road pricing is a regressive policy because it 
hurts low-income individuals more than others.  Opponents say that a mileage charge would take 
up a greater proportion of a poor person‟s budget than that of a middle or high income individual 
(Schweitzer, 2011).  This is true but the argument suggests that regressive pricing should be 
avoided, even when so many goods and services in our society already have the same regressive 
price structures.  Heat, electricity, even a loaf of bread all cost the same regardless of someone‟s 
income.   
Some policymakers in jurisdictions that practice road pricing have established discounts 
on the charges for some drivers that were argued to deserve it.  This is not the best option 
because firstly, it goes against the user-pay logic and second, there are different types of equity 
that can and should be addressed but are not. Viegas argues that there is a distinction between 
“Horizontal equity” which means having equal opportunities no matter where you live, and 
protecting those in worse conditions, and “Longitudinal equity” which means the comparison of 
conditions between present and past, for each citizen individually, and for social groups based on 
gains and losses (Viegas, 2001).  Providing discounts would bring only horizontal equity, 
because the road pricing revenue would be taken out of the transportation sector and put into 
something else, leaving a less-than-optimally funded transportation system for future 
generations. 
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Creating a Credit System 
Rationing road use using a credit-based system can be a way to price roads while 
providing both horizontal and longitudinal equity.  Veigas states that while traditional forms of 
rationing scarce goods are often associated with high transaction costs and administrative abuse, 
electronic road pricing can avoid these costs (Viegas, 2001).  GNSS tolling, an advanced form of 
electronic road pricing, can be especially effective at delivering what Gulipallia and Kockelman 
call “mobility credits” that can be put on a smart card and inserted into an On-board Unit 
(Gulipallia & Kockelman, 2008).   
Mobility credits could be distributed on a monthly or annual basis from the road pricing 
billing service operator(s) to every resident of a jurisdiction as opposed to each vehicle.  If the 
credits are made to be completely tradable, say through an online exchange system, people can 
sell them to others (Viegas, 2001).  Exchangeable credit would compound the road pricing 
signals in three ways: First, the motorist who buys such credits would directly subsidize some-
other person to use a non-automotive alternative – or at least to use their automobile on 
uncongested roads and at uncongested times.  Second, the value of not driving would now be 
rewarded, as opposed to only having the act of driving taxed. And third, if a cap was put on the 
number of credits available to everyone, the credit market would measure the value of road use, 
informing the government on how to set the road prices (ibid).   
 
When it comes to disadvantaged people, the cost of the On-board Unit itself could be 
paid for over time, as is done for cell phones.  Initial credits given could help pay as well.  For 
example, disadvantaged motorists can be given initial discounts, as they may need time to adapt 
their commuting habits to the new road charges.  Once they adapt, they could sell their credits to 
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finance the alternative practice.  Those with dependents would receive a proportionate amount of 
credits as they would likely have to take more trips (daycare, doctor etc.).  The whole credit 
system could be financed via credit transaction charges or via the road pricing scheme itself 
(Grush, 2007).   
The most uninformed, but still prominent argument against road pricing is that roads 
should be kept free.  Roads are in fact not free but are paid for in a variety of ways by both users 
and non-users.  Nevertheless, this argument still has persuasive ability.  For example, in the late 
1990s, San Diego County‟s High Occupancy Toll lanes were proving to be so effective at 
improving the flow of the freeway and optimizing the lanes‟ level of use that the government 
was expanding the system.  As mentioned in a previous chapter, a political movement had 
developed demanding that all the lanes should be “free”.  This movement focused only on two 
lanes of one freeway, and did not significantly influence the County‟s politics.  However, a 
political movement against the tolling of all public roads in the GTA could have the potential to 
affect government policy.   
Overcoming the argument that roads should not be tolled in any way, requires effective 
political communication. Messages that focus on the need to fund public transit or make road use 
more economically efficient are not going to sound appealing to drivers if they have to pay more. 
Instead, the differences between “taxes” and “user fees” should be emphasized.  The Canadian 
Taxpayers Federation argues that the most effective way to keep taxes in check is for citizens 
and business to pay directly for the services they use (Bader, 2008).  Using this logic, Myers and 
Kent claim that the costs of road building and maintenance, traffic management, congestion, road 
accidents, pollution, free parking, garages, fuel stations, and oil industry subsidies are “over and 
above” what drivers pay in gas taxes and other fees (Myers & Kent, 1998). Because GNSS 
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tolling can account for the benefits mentioned above, one political message should be “we‟re 
going to make the costs of roads more transparent to those who benefit from them” instead of 
“we‟re going to make drivers pay their fair share”.  As mentioned above, improving the 
transparency of transportation finance involves a revenue shift from taxes to more 
comprehensive user fees first through tax rebate methods until a formal replacement is possible.  
Currently however, the government is probably not sufficiently trusted to force a shift 
from fuel taxes to road user fees by promise and mandate.  Even if the shift already involved 
fully hypothecated revenues, it is unlikely the government will gather the courage. Moreover, 
studies show that simply earmarking revenues is not enough to gain acceptance of road pricing.  
From a psychological point of view, drivers need to believe that they will benefit greatly from a 
policy change from the status quo (Schuitema & Steg, 2008).  Humans have irrational tendencies 
in terms of how they value losses versus gains.  Charging drivers to use roads is perceived as a 
loss, and Schade & Schlag posit that people experience losses more intensely than gains of 
similar magnitude (Schade & Schlag, 1999).  For example, if one expects to receive a B grade in 
a class, they would be more disappointed about receiving a C grade than happy about receiving 
an A grade.  This idea is extended to what is called “Loss Aversion”, the fact that people prefer 
avoiding losses over two times more than acquiring gains (ibid). When it comes to the risks of 
making certain choices, people are willing to take more risk to avoid losses than to make gains.  
The implications for road pricing are that people are willing to risk experiencing more 
congestion than to potentially pay more to experience the gains that have been promised. 
Therefore, if a driver asks “what‟s in it for me?” they need to perceive that the answer is twice as 
powerful as the expected sacrifice. GNSS tolling can provide these gains, but it is critical that 
this type of policy is properly perceived.  
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A common, but potentially unproductive message for road pricing advocates is “we are 
trying to promote alternative modes of transportation”. Some opponents of road tolls, hearing 
this message, perceive that they are being coerced out of their cars and onto a bus. There are 
probably very few politicians that think private automobile use is intrinsically bad, and so their 
message should instead be “overuse of automobiles is unsustainable”. Messages need to stress 
the abundance of choices people have.  After the government chooses the common standards for 
mileage data generation and transfer, the rest of the choices are left up to the motorist.  They 
would choose how to comply. They could do so with an On-board Unit that differentiates 
charges based on time or place. They would also choose the level of sophistication for their On-
board Unit and the associated privacy level along with what added services they choose to 
receive (ibid).   
 
Oregon does not expect such legislation to be written or passed soon.  The same goes 
for GNSS tolling in the GTA, where a voluntary, market-based approach could take many years 
to be realized.  Over these years, the technology will improve and the political messaging can 
intensify. In jurisdictions where road pricing was on the verge of implementation, studies have 
shown that people who believe road pricing is coming exhibit much more positive attitudes 
toward it.  The theory to explain this result is called “cognitive dissonance”.  This theory 
suggests that when there is an inconsistency between attitudes or behaviours (dissonance), 
people are motivated to reduce or to eliminate the dissonance because these inconsistencies 
cause discomfort.  The easiest way to do this is to develop a positive attitude (Schade & Baum, 
2007).  Those with the most severe negative attitudes who are least likely to accept the forces of 
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cognitive dissonance are likely to be those who are the most automobile-dependent for their 
commutes.  In the GTA, those with the longest commute lengths live in Halton, York, and 
Durham regions (HDR Corporation, 2008).  These regions have poor transit service compared to 
the rest of the GTA. With GNSS time, distance, and place tolling, some drivers in these regions 
would pay less than with the gas tax because of their proximity to uncongested roads.   
 
6.2 Analysis of how Road Pricing can be Governed 
The GTA is a conurbation consisting of many local jurisdictions that have different 
needs and interests when it comes to the regional transportation system and other services 
(Swainson, 2000).  It is inevitable that the political attitudes towards GNSS tolling and 
restructuring the transportation finance system will be different among each municipality.   If the 
road pricing scheme is to be regional in scope, a decision has to be made about how the scheme 
will be managed. Local opposition to road pricing can block any implementation efforts (King, 
2011).  Municipalities might not approve of a regional body making decisions for them.  
In the GTA, there exists no single unified metropolitan government. Instead, the region 
consists of several local governments including one large one-tier municipality (the City of 
Toronto), surrounded by four regional municipalities. These four regional municipalities (York, 
Peel, Durham and Halton) are the upper tiers of two-tier structures, and each regional 
municipality contains several lower-tier municipalities. In total, there are 24 lower-tier 
municipalities in these four regional municipalities, 23 of which form part of the Toronto Region 
(OECD, 2009).    
The current governance structure of the GTA is the result of provincial decisions since 
the 1970s not to build on the metropolitan model that had been instituted in the 1950s. From 
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1953 until 1997, Toronto had a two-tiered government structure, whose upper level of 
government, the Metropolitan Toronto Council (Metro), was responsible for “metropolitan” 
issues (OECD, 2009). This structure was not updated, however, to take account of the population 
growth outside the boundaries of Metro. Instead, in 1971, the provincial government created the 
four new two-tier governments in the suburbs surrounding Metro, or the “905” according to its 
telephone area-code.  After this period, five regional municipalities effectively governed the 
Toronto region. No single body was responsible for the entire area (OECD, 2009). 
 
In 1998, the provincial government undertook two major operations regarding 
municipal affairs.  The first was the transfer of funding responsibility for several government 
functions from the Province to the municipalities. The second was the amalgamation process.  
The Metro Toronto municipalities were merged to create a single government, the City of 
Toronto.  Two developments had a large impact on governance arrangements and 
intergovernmental relationships in the GTA.  Amalgamation required the merger of different 
government administrations.  The provincial government at the time recognized the need to 
improve regional governance.  It created the Greater Toronto Services Board in the same year to 
work on fighting urban sprawl with land use and transportation planning strategies for the region.   
The Greater Toronto Services Board consisted of local politicians throughout the region. 
It tried to create an official transportation and land use plan for the GTA. Essentially, this meant 
trying to agree on minimum suburban population densities that would support rapid transit.  
It did not take long for major conflicts to appear between the Board‟s political members. 
The “905” leaders did not want to limit their abilities to sell land to developers for low-density 
housing. The Board‟s Chairman, Alan Tonks (a Toronto politician), resigned over this conflict 
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(Toronto Star, 2000b). Tonks was replaced by another Toronto politician, Gordon Chong, who 
moved more aggressively in advocating for sprawl-fighting measures.  Chong felt that the 
Greater Toronto Services Board was merely acting like a seminar for discussing problems. He 
threatened the Province that if it did not act and give the Greater Toronto Services Board more 
power to achieve its goals, the Board would disband (Swainson, 2001).  
The idea of a stronger Greater Toronto Services Board faced opposition from 
developers and the broader business community.  The developers feared the Greater Toronto 
Services Board would restrict lucrative suburban developments.  The Ontario Chamber of 
Commerce wanted a non-political board to be in charge (Hall, 2001).  Premier Mike Harris was 
worried that a stronger Greater Toronto Services Board would be perceived by the “905” as 
another layer of government. In the end, Harris‟ government dissolved the Board (Urquhart, 
2001).  
The next provincial government, run by the Liberals, was able to bypass conflict 
between municipalities on the issues of planning and transportation.  It passed the Places To 
Grow Act in 2005. The Act required municipalities to plan for minimum population and 
employment densities in existing built-up areas (MOI, 2011). It also passed the Metrolinx Act in 
2006, forming a regional transportation authority made up of non-political board members.  In 
turn, Metrolinx created the Regional Transportation Plan.  The Metrolinx Act was changed in 
2009  to give the agency the responsibility of managing GO Transit (Metrolinx, 2011).   
Metrolinx would logically be a large future recipient of the tax revenues for 
transportation, directly or indirectly, that would otherwise have been received by municipal 
governments.  Because Metrolinx will be placed in a decision-making capacity, some 
organizations such as the Toronto Board of Trade and the Conference Board of Canada feel that 
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it would therefore be an ideal Special Purpose Body with the authority to toll roads (Hume, 
2008).  However, simply changing the Metrolinx Act to give it more powers is easier said than 
done.    
There are a few major shortcomings with the idea of making Metrolinx a Special Purpose 
Body with new taxing powers. First, there would be a need for accountability, and citizens may 
demand the Metrolinx Board be democratically elected.  However, the Toronto Board of Trade 
and the Conference Board of Canada feel that governance of a GTA-wide Special Purpose Body 
would be best achieved through boards comprised of independent individuals answerable to 
elected officials (Soberman, 2010). If there are decisions pending that would benefit the region 
but do not compliment the politics of the moment, directly elected board members may be afraid 
to make them.  
 
Another shortcoming with creating a Special Purpose Body out of Metrolinx is that such 
a creation would make governance in the GTA overall less efficient. Special Purpose Bodies 
tend to do everything on their own.  The two-tier municipal structure in the 905 creates savings 
in operations that are not available to Special Purpose Bodys such as sharing certain legal and 
administrative personnel and facilities (Kitchen, 2008). This extra separated form of government 
could not only seem inefficient but also too complicated for citizens to understand.  If citizens 
are not sure about who is accountable, they may lose interest in local (and regional) government 
(ibid).  Given that there are many shortcomings and challenges with creating a Special Purpose 
Body for the GTA, it may instead be best to focus efforts at restructuring the region‟s municipal 
governance beyond transportation services.   
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They shortcomings and challenges associated with creating a Special Purpose Body for 
the GTA suggest that it may be best to restructure the region‟s existing municipal governance 
beyond transportation services. Kitchen claims that over the past two decades, services have 
“migrated” from the local municipalities to the regional governments, and therefore it is a logical 
choice for the latter to fully absorb the former (Kitchen, 2008).  Another option came up during 
the days of the Greater Toronto Services Board.  Some 905 mayors expressed interests in 
scrapping the governments of Peel, York, Durham, and Halton if their responsibilities were 
divided up between the Greater Toronto Services Board and the local municipalities (Toronto 
Star, 2000a).  Both these options could be problematic and unpopular if local autonomy is 
surrendered or if smaller and more dependent municipalities would have to merge to take care of 
themselves.   
When the Province passed the Places To Grow and Metrolinx Acts, it proved that 
adding a new layer of regional government was not necessary to coordinate the GTA‟s land use 
and transportation planning.  The same could be true for GTA transportation finance.  Instead of 
giving Metrolinx the authority to set rates and collect revenue, the Province could authorize it 
only to spend a percentage of the annual transportation revenues the Province allots. Nor would a 
new government have to collect toll revenue as well.  As explained in earlier chapters, the task of 
direct toll collection could be taken by private billing service operators with government 
contracts. The Province could decide on the toll rates and/or which transportation services it 
wants to fund (after the legislated amount is given to Metrolinx). The toll rates could be set to be 
revenue positive, meaning local property taxes would no longer bear the brunt of financing 
transportation infrastructure.  This would help resolve one of the main governance challenges, 
which is inadequate “local fiscal architecture” (OECD, 2009). 
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GNSS tolling under provincial management would not be without its challenges 
because GTA municipalities have shown to be stubborn when it comes to regional initiatives.  
One of the current barriers to cooperation is that municipalities feel they do not have incentives 
to share their resources without direct benefits (Civic Action, 2011).  Local governments might 
not like the idea of Metrolinx taking away their authority to spend all money dedicated to 
transportation, and may not view the benefits as being direct.  It would be helpful if as the time 
for implementing GNSS tolling approaches, GTA municipalities would have already 
experienced a greater degree of cooperation, so that sharing tolling revenues would seem like a 
logical next step.   
Currently, there are forces advocating for greater regional strategic planning in the GTA.  
In its 2010 Territorial Review of the Toronto Area, the OECD argued at length for the need for 
the GTA to increase its economic competitiveness through regional cooperation. Though the 
Review argues that policy coordination and alignment is more likely to be achieved when 
existing institutions cooperate (as opposed to creating new institutional organizations), they 
recommend the Province builds off its successes of the Metrolinx and Places to Grow Acts 
(OECD, 2009).   
 
Regional Linkages and Cooperation 
One way to begin is to consider the strong linkage between transportation infrastructure 
and economic development since, for example, transportation corridors can link companies with 
the employees and suppliers whom may be based in another municipality (OECD, 2009).   
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Since there is no regional inter-sectoral institution in the GTA, and there is little appetite 
for more governments or further amalgamation, a group called Civic Action has tried to fill the 
role of promoting GTA cooperation (Deans & Tory, 2011). Civic Action is an organization that 
acts as a platform for collaboration among the GTA‟s public and private actors. Civic Action has 
worked for years already to encourage GTA mayors to coordinate policies such as cluster 
development and integrating immigrants (Civic Action, 2011).  There are currently twenty 
organizations in the GTA working on economic development. Civic Action works to facilitate 
regular conventions between these organizations and other stakeholders.  The latest convention 
of business, labour, the academic, non-profit and voluntary sectors, called the 2011 Greater 
Toronto Economic Summit, allowed these actors to discuss the next steps towards increasing 
regional competitiveness, such as creating a regional investment promotion agency (Civic 
Action, 2011).  Though continuous dialogue is vital, serious political action towards regional 
integration may not occur until there are direct financial benefits for local governments. Though 
correcting the fiscal architecture of local governments and developing an efficient and effective 
regional transportation system are excellent future benefits, the Province will have to offer short 
term incentives as well.  
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7.0 Conclusion 
Alleviating congestion in the GTA is possible, but introducing the necessary measures 
involves facing very difficult hurdles.  These hurdles include the costs of the tolling 
infrastructure and privacy concerns about how vehicle travel data is recorded. Choosing to toll 
all roads with GNSS technology and On-board Units can enlarge these hurdles but at the same 
time make these hurdles possible to overcome in the long term.   
The Ontario government should take steps to dedicate its fuel tax revenues entirely to 
transportation expenditures, creating transparency with the money it currently takes from drivers.  
At the same time, the government should create a voluntary opt in program for drivers to 
purchase the GNSS technology with its associated valued added services.  These drivers could 
pay road user fees in exchange for a fuel tax rebate.  The Province can regulate the market for 
this technology and encourage the reform of parking management to create incentives for drivers 
to join.   
After enough volunteers have joined the program, and after the technology has been 
proven, the Province could write legislation to shift from fuel taxes to road user fees to pay for 
transportation services and infrastructure.  Such legislation would then be politically viable 
because the unique advantages of GNSS technology will allow the government to minimize the 
credibility of opposing arguments.  Road pricing would not be in the form of an additional tax, 
but instead a shift from gas taxes to user fees.  The Province can work with its private sector 
partners to administer the fees and manage the revenues themselves.  
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